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Abstract
Self-knowledge is a type of personal semantic knowledge that concerns one’s self-image and personal identity. It has most often
been operationalized as the summary of one’s personality traits (“I am a stubborn person”). Interestingly, recent studies have
revealed that the neural correlates of self-knowledge can be dissociated from those of general semantic and episodic memory in
young adults. However, studies of “dedifferentiation” or loss of distinctiveness of neural representations in ageing suggest that
the neural correlates of self-knowledge might be less distinct from those of semantic and episodic memory in older adults. We
investigated this question in an event-related potential (ERP) study with 28 young and 26 older adults while they categorised
personality traits for their self-relevance (self-knowledge conditions), and their relevance to certain groups of people (general
semantic condition). Participants then performed a recognition test for previously seen traits (episodic condition). The amplitude
of the late positive component (LPC), associated with episodic recollection processes, differentiated the self-knowledge, general
semantic, and episodic conditions in young adults, but not in older adults. However, in older adults, participants with higher
composite episodic memory scores had more differentiated LPC amplitudes across experimental conditions. Moreover, consis-
tent with the fact that age-related neural dedifferentiation may be material and region specific, in both age groups some
differences betweenmemory types were observed for the N400 component, associated with semantic processing. Taken together,
these findings suggest that declarative memory subtypes are less distinct in ageing, but that the amount of differentiation varies
with episodic memory function.
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The distinction between episodic and semantic memory
(Tulving, 1972; see also Herrmann, 1982) remains of central
importance in Cognitive Neuroscience today. Episodic mem-
ory pertains to personal and contextually unique events (I
remember reading 1984 at Hyde Park yesterday), whereas
semantic memory contains culturally shared, acontextual fac-
tual information (1984 is the title of a book written by George
Orwell). The distinction between these two types of declara-
tive memory is supported by a vast amount of behavioural,
functional neuroimaging, and neuropsychological research
(Addis, 2018; Irish, 2019; Renoult et al., 2019; Renoult &
Rugg, 2020; Tulving, 2002) and these two types of memory
have been studied extensively in young and older adults.
However, recent data also suggest that the relations between
semantic and episodic memory may be more complex than
previously thought, opening the door to new models of cate-
gorization and memory. Not only do semantic and episodic
memory seem to interact more than commonly thought
(Greenberg & Verfaellie, 2010; Renoult et al., 2015), but also
other forms of declarative memory collectively referred to as
semantic autobiographical memory or personal semantics
have recently gained increased attention (Acevedo-Molina
et al., 2020; Grilli et al., 2018; Grilli & Verfaellie, 2014,
2015; Irish, 2019; Martinelli, Sperduti, & Piolino, 2013b;
Renoult et al., 2012; Renoult et al., 2015; Renoult et al.,
2016; Tanguay et al., 2018; Tanguay et al., 2020). Personal
semantics refers to the knowledge of one’s past, and knowl-
edge of facts about oneself. The paradox of personal seman-
tics is that it is highly personal (like episodic memory), yet
detached from its context of acquisition (like semantic mem-
ory). Personal semantics has been operationalized in different
ways in the literature. This includes knowledge of autobio-
graphical facts (“I was born on the 25th of June like
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Orwell”), self-knowledge about one’s traits and identity (“I
am a fast reader”), or knowledge of repeated or extended
events (“I used to study Orwell’s work at secondary school”;
reviewed in Renoult et al., 2012; see also Renoult et al., 2020).
Early descriptions assumed that personal semantics was part
of semantic memory. However, more recent evaluations of
this literature (Grilli & Verfaellie, 2014; Renoult et al.,
2012) suggest that this view was too simplistic: whereas some
forms of personal semantics—such as autobiographical
facts—appear to have neural correlates similar to semantic
memory, others—such as memories of repeated events—
have neural correlates that are similar to those of episodic
memory. This more recent view highlighted that personal se-
mantics had not been well integrated within the framework of
declarative memory, but also that there was a critical need for
studies comparing personal semantics alongside both seman-
tic and episodic memory. Recent lesion and electrophysiolog-
ical studies indeed suggest that the neural correlates of some
forms of personal semantics can be dissociated from (general)
semantic memory (Grilli et al., 2018; Grilli & Verfaellie,
2014, 2016; Klein & Lax, 2010; Marquine et al., 2016;
Renoult et al., 2015; Renoult et al., 2016; Tanguay et al.,
2018; Tanguay et al., 2020). Self-knowledge is a particularly
interesting type of personal semantics in this context, as some
studies have revealed that it can be dissociated from both
semantic and episodic memory (Klein & Lax, 2010;
Marquine et al., 2016; Tanguay et al., 2018; Tanguay et al.,
2020; Tulving, 1993). Self-knowledge is related to self-image
and personal identity and has been most often operationalized
as the summary of one’s personality traits (“I am a stubborn
person”). However, even though self-knowledge is generally
considered to be the most abstract type of personal semantics
and to have a greater similarity to semantic than episodic
memory (Renoult et al., 2012), its relation to semantic and
episodic memory is still unclear because studies have most
often compared self-knowledge only to another type of mem-
ory (e.g., semantic memory) or examined it in patients with a
deficit in a single domain (i.e., semantic or episodic memory).
Very few studies have examined the neural correlates that
underlie distinctions between self-knowledge, semantic, and
episodic memory.
Another relatively unexplored issue is whether personal
semantics mainly concerns knowledge of facts and events
from our past and present, or also applies to the future (but
see Conway et al., 2019, for a recent overview). A number of
studies have reported that people also possess knowledge
about personal facts and events that they anticipate happening
in the future (e.g., D’Argembeau & Demblon, 2012;
D’Argembeau & Mathy, 2011). However, it is not perfectly
clear whether thinking about these possible selves (Markus &
Nurius, 1986) or “temporally extended selves” (Prebble et al.,
2013) relies on similar neural substates as thinking about our
present self. In the case of self-knowledge, there is evidence
that medial prefrontal regions are more active when consider-
ing present as compared with past or future selves
(D’Argembeau et al., 2008; D’Argembeau et al., 2010), but
that other regions like the inferior parietal cortex are more
active when thinking about temporally distant selves
(D’Argembeau et al., 2010; see also Nyberg et al., 2010). A
recent event-related potential (ERP) study observed similar
N400 amplitudes, reliably associated with semantic process-
ing (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011), whether participants thought
about their present traits or about their past or future self
(Tanguay et al., 2018). However, the amplitude of the LPC,
typically associated with episodic recollection (Wilding &
Ranganath, 2012), was larger when participants considered
their past or future traits than their present selves, and these
amplitudes were undistinguishable from those elicited in an
episodic recognition task (Tanguay et al., 2018; see also
Tanguay et al., 2020).
These results suggest that the neural correlates of self-
knowledge differ in relation to temporal perspective in young
adults. All time perspectives appear to involve semantic mem-
ory to some degree but thinking about the self in time would
also involve episodic memory, as suggested by the modula-
tions of the LPC (Tanguay et al., 2018; Tanguay et al., 2020).
Tulving (2002, 2005) has described the crucial role of episod-
ic memory to mentally travel in one’s own past or future. In
contrast, semantic knowledge is thought to be “actualized” in
the present moment (Tulving, 1983), but would not be
completely atemporal in the sense that it includes knowledge
about time and about “possible future worlds” (Tulving,
2005). This is consistent with studies of amnesic patients
who are able to list relevant issues about the future, presum-
ably due to their preserved semantic knowledge, but provide
impoverished descriptions when asked to elaborate on these
descriptions (Race et al., 2013). The importance of this factual
knowledge about the future is also demonstrated in semantic
dementia patients, suffering from a severe impairment in se-
mantic memory. Indeed, these patients were shown to have
difficulties constructing detailed future scenarios, despite rel-
atively preserved episodic memory (Irish et al., 2011; Irish &
Piguet, 2013). This has been interpreted as suggesting that
semantic memory would provide the “scaffolding” necessary
to construct and simulate future events (Irish et al., 2011),
consistent with Tulving’s idea that episodic memory opera-
tions typically depend on semantic memory (Tulving, 2002).
Semantic and episodic memory thus both typically contribute
to thinking about our future selves. This entails that, depend-
ing on the task or the situation, one might rely to different
degrees on general and personal knowledge, and on episodic
memory, to reflect on their personal identity.
Studies of age differences in declarative memory have re-
peatedly reported a decline of episodic memory in ageing
(Alghamdi & Rugg, 2020; Cansino, 2009; Tromp et al.,
2015) but generally preserved semantic memory function, as
Mem Cogn
assessed for instance by comprehension or general knowledge
tests (Irish et al., 2011; Piolino et al., 2003) or via the extrac-
tion of semantic details within autobiographical narratives
(Levine et al., 2002; St Jacques & Levine, 2007). Very little
is known about personal semantics and how its neural corre-
lates differ from those of general semantic and episodic mem-
ory in healthy ageing, although this may offer significant new
avenues for clinical diagnosis and memory rehabilitation. For
instance, as it has been demonstrated that individuals with
impaired episodicmemory could be trained to rely on personal
semantics to compensate for their deficits (Pauly-Takacs et al.,
2011; see also Grilli & Ryan, 2020), evaluating preserved
subtypes of personals semantics might be a useful approach
in memory-impaired individuals. Behavioural research sug-
gests that personal semantics is more resilient to the ageing
process than episodic memory (Abram et al., 2014; Martinelli,
Sperduti, & Piolino, 2013b; Melendez et al., 2018; Piolino
et al., 2003), sometimes somewhat affected (Piolino et al.,
2003; Wank et al., 2020), and sometimes unimpaired
(Abram et al., 2014; Martinelli, Anssens, et al., 2013a;
Melendez et al., 2018) or even enhanced (Acevedo-Molina
et al., 2020; Renoult et al., 2020) in older adults compared
with younger adults. Self-concept clarity, such as confidence
in trait judgements, increases from young adulthood to middle
adulthood, but decreases in older age (Lodi-Smith et al.,
2017). Limitations in social roles and activities (e.g., due to
illness) appear to explain the lower self-concept clarity (Lodi-
Smith et al., 2017). There might be age differences in personal
semantics when these depend on the medial temporal lobe,
such as when they are attached to a spatiotemporal context
(Grilli & Verfaellie, 2014, 2016). Characteristics of personal
semantics relate with positive outcomes in older adults: For
example, higher personal semantics scores are related to iden-
tity strength (Haslam et al., 2011). Generating more positive
personal semantics is also related with a more positive self-
concept (Martinelli et al., 2013a, b), and with well-being
(Rathbone et al., 2015).
A number of studies have described a “dedifferentiation”
or loss of distinctiveness of neural representations in ageing
(Cabeza et al., 2018; Koen et al., 2020; Koen & Rugg, 2019;
Li et al., 2001). This dedifferentiation has sometimes been
interpreted as reflecting an increase in “neural noise”, poten-
tially due to disruption of neuromodulatory systems, or to an
imbalance between excitation and inhibition processes
(Fornito et al., 2015). Age-related dedifferentiation reflects
decreased selectivity of neural activity, and is typically
operationalised as a reduced difference in activity in older
adults between preferred and nonpreferred stimulus categories
for a given brain region (Koen & Rugg, 2019). However, the
fact that age-related neural dedifferentiation appears to be ma-
terial and region specific seems incompatible with interpreta-
tions related to a general change in signal to noise in ageing.
For instance, while consistent evidence of category-level
dedifferentiation has been reported for faces (in the fusiform
face area) and for scenes (in the parahippocampal place area),
dedifferentiation is much less commonly observed in studies
presenting images of objects (reviewed in Koen et al., 2020).
Interestingly, recent fMRI studies have reported less distinct
item-specific representation in older as compared with youn-
ger adults during episodic encoding (Zheng et al., 2018) and
during episodic recall (St-Laurent et al., 2014), but also less
distinct activations when comparing the neural correlates of
semantic and episodic memory (Park et al., 2004; St-Laurent
et al., 2011). Similar observations of a dedifferentiation or loss
of distinctiveness of neural representations in ageing has been
reported in ERP studies (Boutet et al., 2020; Clawson et al.,
2017; Galdo-Alvarez et al., 2009; Mott et al., 2014). For ex-
ample, Boutet et al. (2020), observed less selective and less
lateralised N170 amplitudes to faces in older than in young
adults. Mott et al. (2014) reported less distinct P300 ampli-
tudes in ageing using a task that examines attentional process-
es, the oddball task. More precisely, the P300 amplitudes for
target (i.e., infrequent stimuli that required a response) and
standards (i.e., frequent stimuli that did not require a response)
were less distinct in ageing, and the amount of differentiation
was negatively associated to age (being reduced in middle
age, as compared with young adults, and further reduced in
older adults; Mott et al., 2014). However, ERP studies on
dedifferentiation in ageing have rarely considered the domain
of declarative memory (but see Wolk et al., 2009). A dedif-
ferentiation of memory types in ageing could also apply to
personal semantics, its neural correlates being potentially less
distinguishable from those of semantic and episodic memory
as compared with what is observed in younger adults (Renoult
et al., 2016;Tanguay et al., 2018 ; Tanguay et al., 2020). Based
on the results that we have reviewed above, a particularly
interesting question will be whether differences in the neural
correlates of self-knowledge in relation to time perspective
(Tanguay et al., 2018; Tanguay et al., 2020) will also be ob-
served in older adults.
Two ERP components are of particular interest in the study
of declarative memory: the N400 and the late positive com-
ponent (LPC), which have been reliably associated with se-
mantic processing (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011) and episodic
recollection (Wilding & Ranganath, 2012), respectively.
Ageing tends to be associated with a general reduction in
amplitude of these ERP components (Wlotko et al., 2010).
However, consistent with the relative preservation of semantic
memory in ageing, N400 effects (the difference between two
experimental conditions) are generally found to be similar in
young and older adults (Wlotko et al., 2010). ERPs studies
have also supported evidence for the preservation of
familiarity-based recognition in ageing (Friedman, 2013),
where a stimulus may be recognized without retrieval of rel-
evant contextual details (but note that the functional signifi-
cance of the ERP index of familiarity, or FN400, is still
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controversial). Finally, consistent with a selective impairment
of episodic recollection in ageing, LPC effects are not consis-
tently observed in older adults in episodic recognition memo-
ry tasks (Friedman, 2013).
As discussed above, even though self-knowledge is gener-
ally considered to be the most abstract type of personal se-
mantics and to have a greater similarity with semantic than
episodic memory (Renoult et al., 2012), the question of
whether self-knowledge differs from semantic and episodic
memory is still unclear. As semantic memory is generally
well-preserved in ageing (e.g., Irish et al., 2011; Levine
et al., 2002; Piolino et al., 2003; St Jacques & Levine,
2007), we hypothesize that self-knowledge will be a relatively
well-preserved form of personal semantics in healthy ageing.
However, as mentioned above, it is unclear whether consider-
ing self-knowledge across distinct time perspectives would
lead to differentiated neural responses in older adults, as ob-
served in young adults. The results of our recent studies with
young participants (Tanguay et al., 2018; Tanguay et al.,
2020) indeed indicate that the neural bases of self-
knowledge partially overlaps with those of semantic memory,
but also with episodic memory, but could be differentiated
from both. In these studies, LPC amplitudes were maximal
for the episodic condition, intermediate for the self-
knowledge conditions and minimal for general semantics. In
contrast, N400 amplitudes only differentiated self-knowledge
from general semantics (Tanguay et al., 2018). To investigate
how the neural correlates of self-knowledge are affected in
ageing, we recruited a sample of older adults to compare with
the young adults of Tanguay et al. (2018; that were
reprocessed for the present study). Based on previous studies,
we hypothesize that the neural correlates of self-knowledge
will be less distinct from those of semantic and episodic mem-
ory in older adults. As mentioned above, dedifferentiation is
process specific and episodic memory is typically more im-
paired in ageing than semantic memory. We thus more spe-
cifically hypothesized that this dedifferentiation with age will
be more apparent for the LPC than for the N400 in the ERP
analyses, and that the LPC amplitude would more clearly
differentiate time perspective in young adults than in older
adults.
Further, older adults may be less sensitive than young
adults to factors that influence the proximity of personal se-
mantics to semantic and episodic memory. In young adults,
the contextual specificity of personal semantics can make
some types appear more like semantic or more like episodic
memory. The temporal orientation of self-knowledge—
whether it concerns a past or future self versus a present/
atemporal self—may be one aspect of contextual specificity,
that is, temporal specificity. Further, thinking about a distant
self may engage processes associated with temporal distanc-
ing because we must make abstraction of the present to think
about distant times, like episodic memory (or episodic future
thinking). As mentioned above, in our previous studies, we
found that temporal distance influenced the LPC amplitude:
Past and future self-knowledge produced a larger LPC ampli-
tude than general semantics (Tanguay et al., 2018) and present
self-knowledge (Tanguay et al., 2020), but did not significant-
ly differ from episodic memory (Tanguay et al., 2018). Hence,
there are conceptual reasons and some data to suggest that
thinking about a distant self engages component processes
shared with episodic memory (see also Sokol et al., 2017).
Here we consider that trait knowledge may be mostly
acontextual or generalized across contexts when present-
oriented (Tulving, 1983). Episodic processes might help to
anchor the self in a richer representation of the future and
might contribute to envision distant selves with greater preci-
sion. Even though the functional significance of this relation
between episodic processes and thinking about a future self is
unclear, they could contribute to forming a more differentiated
representation of distant selves from the present self while
feeling a sense of connection to that future self. Thus, in this
study, we aimed to explore whether episodicmemory function
in older adults related with behavioural differences between
the distant times and the present, and with the difference in
LPC amplitude between distant times and the present.We also
considered other key cognitive functions that are highly sen-
sitive to ageing, such as executive functions (Spreng et al.,
2017). In agreement with an episodic memory decline in age-
ing and our hypotheses, behavioural research indicates that
older adults perceive that their traits change less through time
compared with young adults (Rutt & Lockenhoff, 2016).
Interestingly, in this study, health, personality and cognitive
factors (e.g., working memory, processing speed) did not ac-
count for this age-difference (Rutt & Lockenhoff, 2016).
However, episodic memory function was not examined. In
the present study, we thus explored the neural and cognitive
basis for age-difference in trait continuity.
Methods
Participants
Thirty-two young participants (15 men), with ages ranging
from 18 to 33 years (Mage = 20.97, SD = 3.65; one participant
did not report their age), and 43 older participants (22 men),
with ages ranging from 65 to 86 (Mage = 73.44, SD = 5.51),
participated in this study. Young adults had completed an
average of 14.84 (SD = 2.23) years of education, and older
adults completed an average of 14.00 (SD = 2.78) years of
education (two missing values).
Undergraduate psychology students at the University of
East Anglia were recruited through an online system and
awarded partial course credit. All other participants were re-
cruited through a participant panel at the School of
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Psychology of the University of East Anglia, and received
£13–15 for their participation (commensurate with study du-
ration). Exclusion criteria consisted of a history of head injury
with loss of consciousness longer than 5 min, other neurolog-
ical or medical conditions known to compromise brain func-
tion, and active substance abuse. All participants had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision, were English native speakers,
and were right-handed. The older adults’ score on the
Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA; Nasreddine et al.,
2005) was equal to or greater than 23 (M = 27.16; SD =
1.86). Some research indicates that a cut-off of 26 may be
overly stringent and may need to be as low as 20 (Waldron-
Perrine & Axelrod, 2012). We included the only two partici-
pants with values below 26. Five participants (two young
adults and three older adults) did not meet eligibility criteria
(i.e., one was left-handed and four for health reasons). We
excluded an additional 15 participants (two young adults and
14 older adults) due to a low number of yes responses (i.e.,
indicating that a certain trait applied to them in the past, pres-
ent, or future or to a specified profession) included in the
average (<15), resulting in a sample of 28 young adults and
26 older adults. The main reason for the high level of exclu-
sion for older adults was an increased tendency to move dur-
ing testing, creating artefacts that sometimes led to the exclu-
sion of a large number of trials. The task included five exper-
imental blocks and even though participants were offered
breaks between blocks, it was still long (2 to 2.5 hours in
total). Even if these artefacts were constrained to one experi-
mental block (i.e., one experimental condition), data from the
other conditions had to be excluded as well due to the nature
of the analysis of variance (ANOVA) analysis. The data of the
young adults have been reported in Tanguay et al. (2018); they
serve as the comparison group for the older adults of this
study.
A sample size of 26 older adults allows us to detect an
effect of Memory on the LPC amplitude assuming the
effect size is half as large as the one of young adults
(ηp
2 = .08 vs. ηp
2 = .16; Tanguay et al., 2018). In
G*Power (Version 3.1.9.7; Faul et al., 2007), we specified
that effect size with an alpha level of .05, power of .90, 2
group, 5 measurements, a .5 correlation among repeated
measures (default), and a nonsphericity correction of 1
(no correction, default), which would require a sample
of 20 participants. However, we aimed for a sample size
at least similar to the young adults.
Neuropsychological assessment
In the group of older adults, a comprehensive neuropsycho-
logical assessment was carried out within 12 months from the
experimental session to assess overall cognitive function, ep-
isodic memory, and executive functions. The MoCA
(Nasreddine et al., 2005) was used as a screening measure of
general cognitive function. We used the Logical Memory type
subtest (WMS III UK; Wechsler, 1997) as a measure of epi-
sodic memory recall for verbal information. In this task, a
short story was read aloud to participants, who then had to
recall it immediately and after a 25-min delay. For the assess-
ment of episodic memory recall for visuospatial information,
we used the Rey–Osterrieth Complex Figure Test (Osterrieth,
1944; Strauss et al., 2006), in which participants were asked to
copy a picture of a complex figure and then to reproduce it
from memory type immediately and after a 25-min delay. We
averaged the Z scores on Logical Memory and Rey–Osterrieth
complex figure delayed recall to obtain a composite of episod-
ic memory function (based on Glisky et al., 1995).
Verbal working memory was assessed with the Digit
Span (WMS III UK; Wechsler, 1997), in which partici-
pants had to repeat a random series of orally presented
digits of progressively increasing length in the same order
(forward condition) or in reverse order (backward condi-
tion). In the Verbal Fluency task (VF; Strauss et al.,
2006), we asked participants to generate in 60 seconds
as many different words as possible beginning with the
letters F, A, or S. We averaged the Z scores of the back-
ward Digit Span and the Verbal Fluency to obtain a com-
posite of executive functions (as in Glisky et al., 1995).
Similarly, we derived a composite score for processing
speed from the averaged Z score on two tasks. Participants
connected a series of numbers in ascending order as quickly
and accurately as possible in Part A of the Trail Making Test
(TMT; Reitan, 1958). For two control measures of the Stroop
task (ST; Golden, 1976), participants named the colours of
printed words and read the words as quickly and accurately
as possible (no conflict).
We omitted the Stroop and Trail Making measure from the
executive functions composite score (and rather included
Digit Span and Verbal Fluency) for three reasons: First, back-
ward digit span and verbal fluency are typically correlated
with one another and load on the same principal component
when examined with other executive function and with mem-
ory tasks in healthy older adults (Glisky et al., 1995; Glisky
et al., 2001). Second, Stroop and TrailMaking are not strongly
associated with backward digit span and verbal fluency in
healthy older adults, perhaps because Stroop and Trail
Making Part B place greater demands on inhibitory function
(Davidson & Glisky, 2002). Finally, the inclusion of the back-
ward digit span and verbal fluency in an executive functions
composite score aligns with prior and ongoing work on mem-
ory, cognition, and brain function (e.g., Davidson et al., 2019;
Taler et al., 2020).
Experimental tasks
This study included five memory type conditions: general
semantics, episodic memory, and past, present, and future
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self-knowledge. The experimental paradigm is described in
more details in Tanguay et al. (2018). Briefly, in the self-
knowledge conditions, participants were asked to indicate if
words reflected their past (5 years ago), present, or future (in 5
years) character traits. In the general semantic task, partici-
pants were asked to indicate whether the character traits
reflected those of most people holding a specific occupation.
We attributed twenty traits (half positive, half negative) to
each of the four occupations, (i.e., soldiers, priests, lawyers,
scientists); the order of these occupation was randomized. For
instance, the task would entail judging whether “fearless” re-
flects the traits of soldiers, whereas being “social” might not
be perceived as reflective of scientists. We selected familiar
occupations that were strongly associated with some traits
(e.g., scientists are inventive), as confirmed with pilot data
(Tanguay et al., 2018). After these four conditions, partici-
pants completed an episodic recognition memory task, indi-
cating if the word had been presented previously (i.e., target
word) or if it was a new word. Participants also provided a
confidence rating after each trial.
Stimuli
Four-hundred words describing people retrieved from Dumas
et al. (2002) were classified as either negative or positive (i.e.,
valence ratings below or above 5 respectively obtained from
Warriner, 2013) and included in this study. We generated six
word lists, each consisting of 80 words each (40 positive, 40
negative). We randomly assigned three lists to the past, pres-
ent, and future versions of the self-knowledge task. There was
a single list of traits for the general semantic condition to
purposefully vary the traits’ relevance to an occupation (e.g.,
soldier: courageous). Lastly, there were two lists for the epi-
sodic memory condition, for old and new words, respectively.
We selected words randomly from the general semantic and
the three self-knowledge conditions (10 positive, 10 negative
traits from each) to form the list of target words in the episodic
recognition memory task (80 old, 80 new). All lists were
matched on likableness, word frequency (Kucera & Francis,
1967), and word length.
Procedure
Participants sat approximately 1 m in front of a computer
screen and were interviewed about their life circumstances 5
years ago, in the present, and 5 years in the future while the
cap was prepared. The experimental tasks were presented with
E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA).
Experimental conditions (general semantics, episodic
memory, and past, present, and future self-knowledge) were
presented in separate blocks with short breaks between blocks
to allow participants to rest if necessary. The general semantic
condition randomly preceded or followed the three self-
knowledge conditions which were also presented in random
order. The episodic recognition memory task always ended
the study. Trials within each block were presented in random
order.
As a general rule, each trial started with a fixation cross of a
variable duration (1,500–2,000 ms), after which a trait was
shown for 2,000 ms (see Fig. 2). The maximum response time
was 3,000 ms, during which people could press 1 or 2 to
respond. A “1” signified “I think the word reflects my
(past/present/future) traits” and “2” meant “I think the word
does not reflect my (past/present/future) traits.” Similarly, in
the semantic memory type task, a “1” represented agreement
with the statement “I think the word reflects the traits of most
people holding the occupation”, and a “2” showed a disagree-
ment. A white screen followed the trait screen for 200 ms, and
this sequence of events ended with a blink screen for 1,000 ms
(inviting participants to blink, if needed).
Additionally, in the general semantic condition, another
self-paced screen was shown every 20 trials indicating a new
occupation to make trait judgements about. In the episodic
memory condition, participants were asked to respond after
the trait was presented to indicate if they had seen the word
before (press 1) or not (press 2). They were then also asked to
report their confidence (1 = Quite sure; 2 = Relatively sure; 3
= Not sure; based on Renoult et al., 2015). The blink screen
was omitted in the episodic memory condition as participants
were able to blink while responding, if needed.
EEG acquisition and preprocessing
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded with a 63-
channel active electrode system (Brain Products GmbH) em-
bedded in a nylon cap (10/10 system extended). An additional
electrode was placed under the left eye in order to monitor
vertical eye movements (lower EOG). The continuous EEG
signal was acquired at a 500 Hz sampling rate using an FCz
reference. The high filter was set at 250 Hz and the time
constant was 10 s. The impedance was kept below 20 kΩ. A
vertical EOG was reconstructed offline as the difference be-
tween the lower EOG and FP1 activity. A horizontal EOG
was constructed by subtracting FT9 from FT10 activity.
Offline analyses were carried out using Brain Vision
Analyser 2. Steps and processing parameters were similar to
Tanguay et al. (2018), but optimized to retain a maximum
number of trials with older adults. Notably, the filtering pa-
rameters were .1 to 30Hz (order 2) with a 50 Hz Notch filter
(instead of .01 to 30Hz without a notch filter). After filtering,
we removed excessively bad channels and performed a semi-
automatic data inspection to exclude noisy segments. We ex-
cluded frontal channels (AF3, AF3, AF7, AF8, Fp1, Fp2)
from the automatic detection of noise as these electrodes are
sensitive to blink artifacts. Analyzer highlighted segments
with an absolute difference of two contiguous sampling points
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larger than 75 μV, and a difference between the minimal and
maximal voltage group larger than 150 μV within a 200-ms
interval. We inspected all data to confirm that all noise was
effectively excluded. Component reflecting eye movements
were removed using automatic ICA ocular correction (Jung
et al., 2000), and the previously removed channels were inter-
polated using spherical interpolation. An average reference
was computed offline and used for all analyses. The EEG
was segmented into epochs of 1 s (from −200 ms prior to, to
800 ms after the onset of the words). The 200 ms precue
period was used for baseline correction. Trials were rejected
after a 200-ms baseline correction if they did not meet the
criteria listed above (see automatic detection of noise), now
with all channels, and (1) if the voltage group was above
100 μV or below −100 μV, or (2) if the difference between
the minimum and maximum voltage group was less than
.5 μV for 100 ms. Participants were excluded if the average
of any condition had less than 15 trials.
The amplitudes of the N400 and the LPCwere measured as
the mean of all data points between 250 to 500 ms and 500 to
800 ms, respectively, as in Tanguay et al. (2018). The N400 is
typically studied at sagittal or para-sagittal sites, and the LPC
at the posterior parietal sites. We included additional sites for
the LPC time window (i.e., frontal, sagittal, para-sagittal) as
scalp distribution can differ in older adults compared with
young adults (e.g., J. H. Ford & Kensinger, 2019; Horne
et al., 2020; Newsome et al., 2012). We averaged Cz, CPz,
and Pz for the sagittal subset, and averaged C1/C3/CP3 for the
left and C2/C4/CP4 for the right hemisphere of the para-
sagittal subset, and averaged P1/P3/PO3 for the left and P2/
P4/PO4 for right hemisphere of the posterior parietal subset,
and also F1/F3/FC3 for the left and F2/F4/FC4 for the right
hemisphere of the frontal subset
Statistical analysis
We ran repeated-measures ANOVAs on behavioural and elec-
trophysiological data. For the self-knowledge (past, present,
and future self-knowledge) and the general semantic condi-
tion, we focused on reaction times and percentage of yes re-
sponses as our behavioural measures while we focused on
reaction times, accuracy, sensitivity, and bias for the episodic
memory condition. The averaged ERP activity for each mem-
ory condition across the ERP-specific time windows was used
as our electrophysiological measure. In addition, we analysed
the averaged LPC activity for hits and correct rejections for the
episodic memory condition only. For the electrophysiological
data, 26 participants in the older adults age group were includ-
ed for which sufficient data was available in all memory type
conditions with an average group number of 29.5 trials in each
condition (Min = 16, Max = 62). For the young adults age
group 28 participants with sufficient trial numbers, on average
34.2 in each condition (Min = 16, Max = 72), were included.
Only “yes” responses were retained for these ERP analyses as
these suggest participants were sufficiently confident in the
presence of a memory type trace. Further, we operationalized
episodic memory as correct recognition of old items regard-
less of confidence. This differed from Tanguay et al. (2018)
because we aimed to retain a maximum of older adults in our
analyses. In additional analyses, to fully characterize our re-
sults, we verified whether hits elicited a larger LPC amplitude
than correct rejections.
The task design is identical to Tanguay et al. (2018) and the
sample of young adults is the same. For greater details on the
task (e.g., stimuli list) and findings for young adults (e.g.,
P200), we invite the reader to refer to Tanguay et al. (2018).
The preprocessing steps and analytical steps differed some-
what to retain a maximum of participants and simplify inter-
pretation because of the added age factor.
Results
Twenty-eight young participants (13 men), with ages ranging
from 18 to 33 years (Mage = 21.26, SD = 3.83; one participant
did not report their age), and 26 older participants (15 men),
with ages ranging from 65 to 83 (Mage = 73.50, SD = 5.32),
were included in the analysis for this study. Young adults had
completed an average of 15.00 (SD = 2.34) years of education,
and older adults completed an average of 14.12 (SD = 2.59)
years of education (one missing value).
Behavioural data: Reaction time
A 2 × 4 × 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA with Age group (between
subject factor with two levels: young adults and older adults),
Memory type (within subject factor with four levels: general
semantic, past self-knowledge, present self-knowledge, and
future self-knowledge), Valence (within subject factor with
two levels: positive and negative), and Response (within-sub-
ject factor with two levels: yes and no) on mean reaction times
(see Fig. 1) revealed a significant main effect of Age group,
F(1, 49) = 14.28, p < .001, ηp
2 = .23, with faster reaction times
for young (M = 1175.60, SE = 26.73) compared with older
adults (M = 1326.01, SE = 29.50). There were also significant
main effects of Valence, F(1, 49) = 32.48, p < .001, ηp
2 = .40,
and Response, F(1, 49) = 10.08, p = .003, ηp
2 = .17. For
Memory type, the main effect was not significant, F(2.44,
119.47) = 1.22, p = .302, ηp
2 = .02, but there was a significant
interaction with Age group, F(2.44, 119.47) = 2.87, p = .050,
ηp
2 = .06. Although young adult always responded faster than
older adults, the magnitude of the difference depended on the
Memory type (general semantics: p = .022, ηp
2 = .10; past
self-knowledge: p = .002, ηp
2 = .18; present self-knowledge:
p = .003, ηp




The effect of Valence depended on Memory type, F(3,
147) = 2.81, p = .042, ηp
2 = .05. Participants responded faster
to positive traits than negative traits in all conditions (general
semantics: p < .001, ηp
2 = .24; present self-knowledge, p =
.021, ηp
2 = .10; future self-knowledge, p < .001, ηp
2 = .30),
except past self-knowledge where positive and negative traits
were not significantly different (p = .223, ηp
2 = .03). The
interactions between Response and Age group, F(1, 49) =
5.34, p = .025, ηp
2 = .10, Response and Valence, F(1, 49) =
201.26, p < .001, ηp
2 = .80, and between Response, Valence,
and Age group, F(1, 49) = 5.64, p = .022, ηp
2 = .10, were also
significant. We ran repeated-measures ANOVAs separately
for each group. The effect of Response depended on
Valence for young adults, F(1, 27) = 86.36, p < .001, ηp
2 =
.76. Young adults were faster to endorse than to reject a trait if
it was positive (p < .001, ηp
2 = .73), but slower to endorse than
to reject a trait if it was negative (p < .001, ηp
2 = .55).
Similarly, the effect of Response depended on Valence for
older adults, F(1, 22) = 110.71, p < .001, ηp
2 = .83. Like for
young adults, older adults were faster to endorse than reject a
trait if it was positive (p < .001, ηp
2 = .69), but slower to
endorse than to reject a trait if it was negative (p < .001, ηp
2
= .78). The interaction seems to have arisen because the inter-
action between Response and Valence was stronger in older
adults than young adults.
The interactions Memory type, Response, Valence, and
Age group, F(3, 147) = 2.43, p = .068, ηp
2 = .05, Memory
type, Response, and Age group, F(3,147) = 0.16, p = .922, ηp
2
< .01, Memory and Response, F(3, 147) = 1.13, p = .338, ηp
2
= .02, Memory type, Valence, and Age group, F(3, 147) =
0.03, p = .992, ηp
2 < .01, Valence and Age group, F(1, 49) =
1.11, p = .298, ηp
2 = .02, were not significant.
This mixed ANOVA excluded three older participants be-
cause they did not have responses for a condition (e.g., “yes”
to having a negative trait in the past), and consequently no
reaction time.
Behavioural data: Percentage of “yes” responses
A 2 × 4 × 2 mixed ANOVA with Age group (between subject
factor: young adults and older adults), Memory type (within
subject factor: general semantic, past self-knowledge, present
self-knowledge, and future self-knowledge), and Valence
(within subject factor: positive and negative) on percentage
of yes responses revealed a main effect of Memory type,
F(3, 156) = 3.59, p = .015, ηp
2 = .07, and a main effect of
Valence, F(1,52) = 496.55, p < .001, ηp
2 = .91. There was also
a significant interaction between Memory type and Valence,
F(3, 156) = 12.49, p < .001, ηp
2 = .19, as well as between
Memory type, Valence, and Age group,F(3, 156) = 11.10, p <
.001, ηp
2 = .18 (see Fig. 2), and data were analysed for each
age group separately. For young adults, the percentage of
endorsed traits per Memory type depended on Valence, F(3,
81) = 20.15, p < .001, ηp
2 = .43. Briefly, young adults
Fig. 1 Mean RTs for positive traits (left; a, c) and negative traits (right; b,
d) for young adults (top row; a, b) and older adults (bottom row; c, d) for
yes and no responses in each memory condition. Error bars represent ± 1
SE. a Mean RTs for positive traits for young adults. b Mean RTs for
negative traits for young adults. c Mean RTs for positive traits for older
adults. d Mean RTs for negative traits for older adults. SM = semantic
memory; SK = self-knowledge
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endorsed more positive traits and less negative traits in the
future self-knowledge condition compared with all other con-
ditions (i.e., general semantics, past self-knowledge, present
self-knowledge, ps < .001; full details described in Tanguay
et al., 2018). Comparatively, the number of endorsed traits per
Valence was not modulated by Memory type for older adults,
F(3, 75) = 0.30, p = .826, ηp
2 = .01. Hence, the temporal
orientation of self-knowledge or whether knowledge con-
cerned the self or other people did not influence the percentage
of endorsed positive and negative traits for older adults. There
was, however, a main effect of Valence as can be expected
F(1, 25) = 253.76, p < .001, ηp
2 = .91, withmore positive traits
being endorsed than negative traits. Further, the percentage of
endorsed traits did not differ between Memory types for older
adults, F(3, 75) = 2.49, p = .067, ηp
2 = .09.
There was also a significant interaction between Valence
and Age group, F(1, 52) = 10.81, p = .002, ηp
2 = .17, and data
were collapsed across Memory type. Young and older adults
endorsed positive traits at similar rates, (p = .119, ηp
2 = .05),
whereas young adults were more likely to endorse negative
traits than older adults (p < .001, ηp
2 = .20). The interaction
between Memory type and Age group was not significant,
F(3, 156) = 0.68, p = .567, ηp
2 = .01.
Behavioural data: Recognition memory task
We entered the measures of performance (i.e., reaction times,
accuracy, sensitivity, bias) on the recognition memory task in
mixed ANOVAs with Age group (between subject: young
adults, older adults) and Valence (within subject: positive,
negative) as factors. The analyses of reaction times and accu-
racy also included Response type (within subject factor: hits
and correct rejections).
Reaction times
This mixed ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Age
group, F(1, 52) = 47.06, p < .001, ηp
2 = .48 with faster reaction
times for young (M = 566.39, SE = 35.32) compared with older
adults (M = 915.52, SE = 36.65). The main effect of Response,
F(1, 52) = 41.51, p < .001, ηp
2 = .44, but not Valence, F(1, 52) =
0.39, p = .537, ηp
2 = .01, was significant. The interaction be-
tween Response and Valence was also significant, F(1, 52) =
10.68, p = .002, ηp
2 = .17 (see Fig. 3). Participants had faster
response times for negative than positive traits when making
correct rejections (p = .039, ηp
2 = .08), whereas negative and
positive traits did not differ for hits (p = .129, ηp
2 = .04). The
other interactions were not significant: Valence and Age group,
F(1, 52) = 0.002, p = .967, ηp
2 < .01; Response type and Age
group,F(1, 52) = 1.20, p = .278, ηp
2 = .02; Age group, Response
type, and Valence, F(1, 52) = 0.93, p = .341, ηp
2 = .02.
Accuracy
This mixed ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of
Response, F(1, 52) = 31.92, p < .001, ηp
2 = .38, but not
Valence, F(1, 52) = 0.06, p = .806, ηp
2 < .01, as well as
significant interactions between Response type and Valence,
F(1, 52) = 101.58, p < .001, ηp
2 = .66, and between Response
type, Valence, and Age group, F(1, 52) = 15.34, p < .001, ηp
2
= .23 (see Fig. 4). We conducted separate ANOVAs for each
Age group.
For older adults, the effect of Response type depended on
Valence, F(1, 25) = 72.36, p < .001, ηp
2 = .74. Older adults
had more hits for positive than negative traits (p < .001, ηp
2 =
.69), and more correct rejections for negative compared with
positive traits (p < .001, ηp
2 = .57). Similarly, Response type
and Valence interacted for young adults, F(1, 27) = 27.48, p <
.001, ηp
2 = .50. More precisely, young adults had more hits if
traits were positive than when they were negative (p = .003,
ηp
2 = .28), and less correct rejection if traits were positive
rather than negative (p = .004, ηp
2 = .27).
The interactions between Valence and Age group, F(1, 52)
= 0.52, p = .473, ηp
2 = .01, and between Response type and
Age group, F(1, 52) = 0.91, p = .346, ηp
2 = .02, were not
significant.
Fig. 2 Mean percentage of yes responses for young adults (left) and older
adults (right) for positive and negative traits in each memory condition;
semantic memory (SM), past self-knowledge (past SK), present self-
knowledge (present SK), and future self-knowledge (future SK). Error
bars represent ± 1 SE
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Sensitivity (d') and Bias (c)
For sensitivity, we found a main effect of Age group, F(1, 52)
= 14.92, p <.001, ηp
2 =.22, because sensitivity was higher in
young adults (M = 1.49, SE = .09) compared with older adults
(M = 1.01, SE = 0.09). The main effect of Valence, F(1, 52) =
3.29, p = .08, ηp
2 = .06, and the interaction between Valence
and Age group, F(1, 52) = 1.04, p = .313, ηp
2 = .02, were not
significant.
The measure of bias produced a main effect of Valence,
F(1, 52) = 104.78, p = .001, ηp
2 = .67, as well as an interaction
between Valence and Age group, F(1, 52) = 10.86, p = .002,
ηp
2 = .17. Young and older adults were more biased towards a
yes response for positive traits (young adults: M = −.36, SE =
.08; older adults: M = −.53, SE = .08) than they were for
negative traits (young adults:M = −.15, SE = .07; older adults:
M = −.12, SE = .07; young adults: p < .001, ηp2 = .33; older
adults: p < .001, ηp
2 = .63). This effect of Valence on bias
appears to have been larger for older adults than young adults.
Summary of behavioural results
When indicating whether presented traits applied to them-
selves (in the past, present or future) or to a specified occupa-
tion, participants were faster to respond to positive than to
negative traits in all conditions except past self-knowledge,
regardless of age group. Both age groups were also faster to
endorse positive compared with negative traits, but this effect
was magnified in older adults. Young adults also endorsed
more positive and less negative traits in the future self-
knowledge condition compared with all other condition while
the number of endorsed traits was not modulated by memory
type for older adults. While both young and older adults en-
dorsed a similar number of positive traits, older adults en-
dorsed fewer negative traits than young adults.
In the episodic memory condition, participants were faster
to correctly reject negative compared with positive traits,
while there was no difference for hits. In term of accuracy
during the episodic memory task, both young and older adults
had more hits and less correct rejections for positive compared
with negative traits. Sensitivity was higher in young than older
adults while both groups showed a bias toward yes responses
for positive compared with negative traits.
Electrophysiological data
N400 time window (250–500 ms)
We tested whether there was a difference in mean N400 am-
plitude over sagittal and para-sagittal sites between the mem-
ory types and whether this was modulated by age group (see
Figs. 5 and 6, panels b–c, for ERP traces, and Fig. 7 for scalp
maps). These mixed ANOVAs included Age group (between
subject factor: young adult, older adults) and Memory type
Fig. 3 Mean RTs for positive and negative traits for hits and correct rejections. Error bars represent ±1 SE
Fig. 4 Mean accuracy in percentage for young adults (left) and older adults (right) for positive and negative traits for hits and correct rejections. Error
bars represent ±1 SE
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(within subject factor: general semantics, past self-knowledge,
present self-knowledge, future self-knowledge, episodic
memory). The para-sagittal ROI also included Hemisphere
(left, right) as a within subject factor.
Over the sagittal ROI, the main effect of Memory type was
significant, F(4, 208) = 2.46, p = .046, ηp
2 = .05, and did not
interact with Age group, F(4, 208) = 1.18, p = .320, ηp
2 = .02.
Episodic memory was less negative than general semantics (p
= .007, Hedges’ g = .36), past self-knowledge (p = .031,
Hedges’ g = .29), but not present self-knowledge (p = .216,
Hedges’ g = .17) or future self-knowledge (p = .955, Hedges’
g = .01). Future self-knowledge was also less negative than
general semantics (p = .033, Hedges’ g = .36) and past self-
knowledge (p = .032, Hedges’ g = .29), and did not differ from
present self-knowledge (p = .237, Hedges’ g = .17). General
semantics did not differ from past (p = .661, Hedges’ g = .07)
or present self-knowledge (p = .325, Hedges’ g = .15), and
past and present self-knowledge did not differ from one an-
other (p = .487, Hedges’ g = .09; see Fig. 6b–c for the ERP
group data of all participants).
Over the para-sagittal subset, Memory type interacted with
Hemisphere, F(3.48, 180.57) = 5.53, p = .001, ηp
2 = .10. Over
the left hemisphere, episodic memory had a less negative am-
plitude compared with general semantics (p < .001, Hedges’ g
= .58), past self-knowledge (p = .006, Hedges’ g = .40), pres-
ent self-knowledge (p < .001, Hedges’ g = .51), and future
self-knowledge (p = .040, Hedges’ g = .31). General seman-
tics and the three self-knowledge conditions did not differ
from one another (ps > .05, Hedges’ g < .22). Over the right
hemisphere, future self-knowledge had a significantly less
negative amplitude compared with episodic memory (p =
.002, Hedges’ g = .46), past self-knowledge (p = .013,
Fig. 5 Grand average group ERPs for young (A1, B1, C1, D1; N = 28)
and older adults (A2, B2, C2, D2; N = 26) of yes responses for semantic
memory, personal semantics (past, present and future self-knowledge)
and episodic memory (all confidence hits), over a frontal, b para-sagittal,
c sagittal, and d posterior parietal sites. Negative voltage is plotted up-
wards. A low-pass filter of 20 Hz was applied on the grand average group
data
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Hedges’ g = .36), and general semantics (p = .030, Hedges’ g
= .32), but not present self-knowledge (p = .211, Hedges’ g =
.20). Episodic memory, general semantics, and past and pres-
ent self-knowledge did not differ from one another (ps > .05,
Hedges’ g = .24). None of the other main effects or interac-
tions were significant: Memory type, F(4, 208) = 2.07, p =
.087, ηp
2 = .04; Hemisphere, F(1, 52) = 1.56, p = .217, ηp
2 =
.03; Memory type × Age group, F(4, 208) = 1.90, p = .112,
ηp
2 = .04; Hemisphere × Age group, F(1, 52) = 3.88, p = .054,
ηp
2 = .07; Memory type × Hemisphere × Age group, F(3.47,
180.57) = 0.33, p = .832, ηp
2 = .01.
As compared with episodic memory, the scalp distribution
of the general semantic condition had a classic centro-parietal
distribution in the N400 time window (see Fig. 7), though the
effect was also apparent over frontal sites in older adults
Summary of the results for the N400 time window At sagittal
sites there was a main effect of memory type with a less neg-
ative N400 amplitude for episodic memory compared with all
other memory types. Future self-knowledge was also less neg-
ative compared with past self-knowledge and general seman-
tic memory. At parasagittal sites episodic memory was less
negative than all other memory types in the left hemisphere
while future self-knowledge was less negative than episodic
memory, past self-knowledge, and general semantic memory.
There were no significant interactions between memory type
and age groups for the N400.
LPC Time Window (500–800 ms)
We entered the mean LPC amplitude over each region of
interest (ROI) in mixed ANOVAs with Age group (between
subject: young adult, older adult) and Memory type (within
subject: general semantics, past self-knowledge, present self-
knowledge, future self-knowledge, episodic memory). The
posterior parietal, para-sagittal, and frontal ROIs also included
a Hemisphere factor (within subject: left, right).
Posterior parietal We tested whether there was a differ-
ence in mean LPC amplitude over posterior parietal
sites (see Figs. 5 and 6, panel D for ERP traces, and
Fig. 8 for scalp maps). The main effect of Memory
type, F(4, 208) = 4.31, p = .002, ηp
2 = .08, and the
interaction between Memory type and Age group, F(4,
208) = 6.19, p < .001, ηp
2 = .11, were significant while
the main effect of Hemisphere, F(1, 52) = 1.65, p =
.205, ηp
2 = .03 , and the interac t ion be tween
Hemisphere and Age group, F(1, 52) = 0.30, p =
.588, ηp
2 = .01, were not. Age group, Memory type,
and Hemisphere also interacted, F(3.12, 162.11) =
3.67, p = .013, ηp
2 = .07. To investigate this interaction
further, we ran repeated measures ANOVAs for each
age group separately with Memory and Hemisphere as
factors.
Fig. 6 Grand average group ERPs (N = 54) of yes responses for semantic
memory, personal semantics (past, present and future self-knowledge)
and episodic memory (all confidence hits) for all participants, over a
frontal, b para-sagittal, c sagittal, and d posterior parietal sites. Negative
voltage is plotted upwards. A low pass filter of 20 Hz was applied on the
grand average group data
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For the older adults, there was no main effect of Memory,
F(2.95, 73.71) = 0.68, p = .567, ηp
2 = .03, no main effect
Hemisphere, F(1, 25) = 0.43, p = .521, ηp
2 = .02, and no
interaction between Memory and Hemisphere, F(2.38,
59.51) = 1.08, p = .355, ηp
2 = .04 (see Fig. 4).
For young adults, the main effect of Memory was signifi-
cant, F(4, 108) = 7.80, p < .001, ηp
2 = .22; see Fig. 5, and the
effect of Memory depended on Hemisphere, F(4, 108) = 3.28,
p = .014, ηp
2 = .11.
General semantics was less positive than all other memory
conditions (past self-knowledge: p = .009, Hedges’ g =
.44; present self-knowledge: p = .028, Hedges’ g = .28; future
self-knowledge: p = .004, Hedges’ g = .45; episodic memory:
p < .001, Hedges’ g = .70) over the left hemisphere, whereas it
was only less positive than episodic memory over the right
hemisphere (p = .003, Hedges’ g = .51; past self-knowledge: p
= .958, Hedges’ g = .01; present self-knowledge: p = .468,
Hedges’ g = .10; future self-knowledge: p = .200, Hedges’ g =
.22). The three self-knowledge conditions were less positive
than episodic memory over both hemispheres (left—past: p =
.013, Hedges’ g = .31, present: p = .014, Hedges’ g = .36,
future: p = .012, Hedges’ g = .26; right—past: p < .001,
Hedges’ g = .56, present: p < .001, Hedges’ g = .65, future:
p = .033, Hedges’ g = .27). Past self-knowledge did not differ
from present or future self-knowledge over both hemispheres
(left—present: p = .446, Hedges’ g = .09, future: p = .766,
Hedges g = .04; right—present: p = .372, Hedges’ g = .12,
future: p = .113, Hedges’ g = .24). Present self-knowledge was
significantly less positive than future self-knowledge over the
right hemisphere (p = .034, Hedges’ g = .34), but not the left
hemisphere (p = .311, Hedges’ g = .12). The main effect of
Hemisphere was not significant, F(1, 27) = 1.29, p = .267, ηp
2
= .05.
Even though, the LPC or parietal old-new effect is typically
investigated at posterior parietal sites, differences in scalp dis-
tributions are sometimes observed in ageing (e.g., J. H. Ford
& Kensinger, 2019; Horne et al., 2020; Newsome et al.,
2012). We thus tested whether older adults could have similar
effects as young adults in the LPC time window at other scalp
sites (frontal, sagittal, para-sagittal):
Frontal At this ROI, the main effect of Memory was signifi-
cant, F(4, 208) = 9.81, p < .001, ηp
2 = .16, and depended on
the Age group, F(4, 208) = 8.18, p < .001, ηp
2 = .14. The main
effect of Hemisphere was also significant, F(1, 52) = 4.27, p =
.044, ηp
2 = .08.
Fig. 7 Isovoltage scalp maps for the N400 time window (250 ms to 500
ms) for young (top row) and older adults (bottom row). Left: Scalp maps
of semantic memory (SM, yes responses) minus hits (EM). Right:
Semantic memory (SM, yes responses) minus the average of all self-
knowledge conditions (SK, yes responses). Scalp maps were prepared
in EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004)
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None of the Memory types differed from one another for
older adults (ps > .05; see Fig. 4a), whereas some differences
emerged for young adults (see Fig. 5a). In young adults, epi-
sodic memory was less positive than all other Memory types
(ps < .001, Hedges’ g > .62). Future self-knowledge was less
positive than present self-knowledge (p = .038, Hedges’ g =
.25) and past self-knowledge (p = .026, Hedges’ g = .30), but
not general semantics (p = .119, Hedges’ g = .22). Past and
present self-knowledge did not differ from one another (p =
.969, Hedges’ g < .01), nor from general semantics (past: p =
.572, Hedges’ g = .07; present: p = .671, Hedges g = .05).
Further, the main effect of Hemisphere was significant, F(1,
52) = 4.27, p = .044, ηp
2 = .08; the mean LPC amplitude was
less positive for the left (M = −0.27, SE = .17) than right
hemisphere (M = −0.02, SE = .18). None of the other effects
were significant: Memory type × Age group × Hemisphere,
F(4, 208) = 0.91, p = .457, ηp
2 = .02; Memory × Hemisphere,
F(4, 208) = 1.48, p = .211, ηp
2 = .03; Age group ×
Hemisphere, F(1, 52) = 3.59, p = .064, ηp
2 = .07.
Para-sagittal None of the interactions with Age group were
significant for the para-sagittal ROI: Memory type and Age
group, F(4, 208) = 0.93, p = .447, ηp
2 = .02; Hemisphere and
Age group F(1, 52) = 1.22, p = .275, ηp
2 = .02; and Memory,
Hemisphere, and Age group, F(4, 208) = 0.53, p = .714, ηp
2 =
.01. The main effects of Memory type, F(4, 208) = 1.56, p =
.186, ηp
2 = .03, and of Hemisphere, F(1, 52) = 3.16, p = .081,
ηp
2 = .06, were not significant but the interaction between
Memory type and Hemisphere was, F(4, 208) = 4.75, p =
.001, ηp
2 = .08. None of the Memory conditions differed from
one another over the right hemisphere, ps > .05 (Hedges’ g <
.22). Over the left hemisphere, general semantic and all self-
knowledge conditions were significantly less positive than
episodic recognition (general semantics: p < .001, Hedges’ g
= .56; past self-knowledge: p = .005, Hedges’ g = .42; present
self-knowledge: p = .010, Hedges’ g = .41; future self-knowl-
edge: p = .004, Hedges’ g = .45). General semantics, past self-
knowledge, present self-knowledge, and future self-
knowledge did not differ from one another (ps > .05,
Hedges’ g < .19).
Sagittal At this ROI, the effect of Memory was also signifi-
cant, F(4, 208) = 6.56, p < .001, ηp
2 = .11, and depended on
Age group, F(4, 208) = 2.53, p = .042, ηp
2 = .05. For older
adults, only present self-knowledge was less positive than
episodic memory (p = .006, Hedges’ g = .32). None of the
other comparisons were significant (p > .05, Hedges’ g < .29,
see Fig. 4c). For young adults (see Fig. 5c), there were several
Fig. 8 Isovoltage scalp maps for the LPC time window (500 ms to 800
ms) in young (top row) and older adults (bottom row). Left: Scalpmaps of
hits (EM) minus semantic memory (SM, yes responses). Right: hits (EM)
minus the average of all self-knowledge conditions (SK, yes responses).
Scalp maps were prepared in EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004)
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additional differences. General semantics was less positive
than present self-knowledge (p = .003, Hedges’ g = .44), fu-
ture self-knowledge (p < .001, Hedges’ g = .53) and episodic
memory (p < .001, Hedges’ g = .57), but not past self-
knowledge (p = .260, Hedges’ g = .15). Past self-knowledge
was also less positive than present self-knowledge (p = .022,
Hedges’ g = .28), future self-knowledge (p = .003, Hedges’ g
= .37), and episodic memory (p = .003, Hedges’ g = .42).
Present self-knowledge did not differ from either future self-
knowledge (p = .518, Hedges’ g = .08) or episodic memory (p
= .192, Hedges’ g = .15), which in turn were also not signif-
icantly different from one another (p = .581, Hedges’ g = .07).
As compared with semantic memory, the scalp distribution
of the episodic memory condition had a classic posterior-
parietal distribution in the LPC time window in young adults,
with local maxima at electrodes Pz and P3 but also over right
temporo-occipital sites (see Fig. 8). In contrast, in older adults,
the effect was reduced in magnitude and mainly apparent at
central sites.
Summary of the results for the LPC time window Across both
age groups, episodic memory was associated with a more
positive LPC amplitude compared with all other conditions
in the left hemisphere at parasagittal sites. For older adults,
the LPC amplitude in the present self-knowledge condition
was less positive than the LPC amplitude in the episodicmem-
ory condition at sagittal sites, while there were no significant
differences between memory conditions at posterior parietal
or frontal sites. For young adults, the general semantic condi-
tion was associated with a reduced LPC amplitude compared
with all other memory conditions in the left and episodic
memory in the right hemisphere at posterior parietal sites. At
frontal sites, episodic memory was associated with a less pos-
itive LPC amplitude compared with all other conditions.
Additionally, future self-knowledge was also associated with
a reduced LPC amplitude compared with the past and present
self-knowledge conditions. At sagittal sites, the general se-
mantic memory and present self-knowledge conditions were
associated with a less positive LPC amplitude compared with
all other conditions but did not differ from each other.
Manipulation check
LPC (500–800 ms)
Awell-established finding is the more positive LPC amplitude
for hits compared with correct rejections, also known as the
parietal old/new effect (Rugg & Curran, 2007). We ran a 2 × 2
× 2 mixed ANOVA with Response type (hits, correct rejec-
tions), and Age group, and Hemisphere as above (see Fig. 9
for ERP traces and Fig. 10 for scalp maps). The main effect of
Response type, F(1, 52) = 13.40, p < .001, ηp
2 = .21, and the
interaction between Response type and Age group were
significant, F(1, 52) = 11.15, p = .002, ηp
2 = 18. For older
adults, there was no significant difference between hits and
correct rejections (p = .824, ηp
2 < .01) while for young adults
the LPC was increased for hits compared with correct rejec-
tions (p < .001, ηp
2 = .33). None of the other effects were
significant: Hemisphere, F(1, 52) = 1.25, p = .269, ηp
2 =
.02; Hemisphere × Age group, F(1, 52) = 0.71, p = .404, ηp
2
= 01; Response type × Hemisphere, F(1, 52) = 2.28, p = .137,
ηp
2 = .04; Response type × Hemisphere × Age group, F(1, 52)
= 0.20, p = .657, ηp
2 < .01. In summary, while there was an
increased LPC amplitude for hits compared with correct re-




Older adults with good episodic memory function might be
able to recruit episodic processing to think about a past and
future self. We hypothesized that the recruitment of episodic
processes could produce a representation of distant selves that
is more precise and contextually specific than the present self.
This rich representation of the future self, well anchored in a
distant time, might differentiate distant selves from the present
self, behaviourally and neurally. If so, those with better epi-
sodic memory function might (1) show a greater mean differ-
ence in percentage of positive or negative traits between dis-
tant and present times (mean of future minus present and past
minus present); (2) show a greater mean difference in LPC
amplitude between distant and present self-knowledge (mean
Fig. 9 Grand-averaged ERPs of hits and correct rejections for older (N =
26) and young (N = 28) adults separately at posterior parietal sites.
Negative voltage is plotted upward. Grand-averages were low-pass fil-
tered at 20 Hz
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of future minus present and past minus present). Executive
functions are also sensitive to ageing and may explain why
some older adults would have reduced cognitive resources to
maintain the goal of the task in mind—including temporal
orientation—while performing a relatively fast-paced task.
Although deficits in executive performance might explain
some of the variance in performance or neural activity, our
core hypotheses concerned episodic memory function and we
included executive functions mostly as comparison. We also
tested whether episodic memory function related with an in-
creased parietal old/new effect. We had 5 key correlations
with a directional hypothesis.
Although no correlation was significant (see Table 1) after
correction for multiple comparison (Holm–Bonferroni), one r
value represented a medium-to-large effect size and had a p
value of .012 (slightly above the cut-off of .01; see Table 1).
Participants with a better episodic memory function had a
larger positive LPC difference associated with the temporal
orientation of self-knowledge (i.e., larger and more positive
LPC amplitude for distant times than now, as seen for young
adults on average). We conducted additional partial correla-
tions to possiblyminimize the effect of confounding variables:
age, symptoms of depression, cognitive status (MoCA), and
the processing speed composite. Controlling for age increased
the strength of the correlation between the episodic memory
composite and mean LPC time difference to, r(22) = .71, and
lowered the p value to .000044. The relation persisted in the
additional partial correlations, which hovered around the
values of the full correlation, symptoms of depression: r(22)
= .45, p = .014; cognitive status: r(22) = .46, p = .012;
Fig. 10 Isovoltage scalp maps in the LPC time window (500 ms to 800 ms) for the old–new effect (hits minus correct rejections) for young adults at the
left, and older adults at the right. Scalp maps were prepared in EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004)
Table 1 Correlation coefficients between neuropsychological tests, LPC amplitude, and behaviour in older adults
1 2 3 4 5
1-Episodic memory composite –


































Note. *p < .05 (one-tailed)
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processing speed: r(22) = .45, p = .013. In summary, partici-
pants with a better episodic memory function had a larger
positive LPC difference associated with the temporal orienta-
tion of self-knowledge and controlling for age increased the
strength of this relation (see Fig. 11).
Discussion
Recent studies have revealed that the neural correlates of self-
knowledge could be dissociated from those of general seman-
tic and episodic memory in young adults (Tanguay et al.,
2018; Tanguay et al., 2020). However, studies of “dedifferen-
tiation” or loss of distinctiveness of neural representations in
older adults (Cabeza et al., 2018; Koen et al., 2020; Koen &
Rugg, 2019), including in semantic and episodic memory
tasks (Park et al., 2004; St-Laurent et al., 2011; St-Laurent
et al., 2014; Zheng et al., 2018), suggest that the neural corre-
lates of self-knowledge might be less distinct from those of
semantic and episodic memory in older adults. The results of
the present ERP study are consistent with this hypothesis. The
amplitude of the LPC component, associated with episodic
recollection, differentiated the self-knowledge, general se-
mantic and episodic conditions in young adults, but not in
older adults. However, in older adults, participants with higher
composite episodic memory scores (based on logical memory
and Rey–Osterrieth complex figure delayed recall perfor-
mance) had more differentiated LPC amplitudes across the
self-knowledge experimental conditions. Our findings thus
suggest that declarative memory subtypes are less distinct in
ageing, but that that the amount of differentiation varies with
episodic memory function.
During the encoding tasks, both young and older adults
were faster to endorse a trait if it was positive, but slower if
it was negative. When considering the percentage of “yes”
responses, we observed that young adults endorsed more pos-
itive traits and less negative traits in the future compared with
the present and past self-knowledge conditions, and also com-
pared with other people’s traits (see also Tanguay et al., 2018),
consistent with an optimism bias (Kanten & Teigen, 2008;
Sharot, 2011). In contrast, in older adults, the temporal orien-
tation of self-knowledge, or whether knowledge concerned
the self or other people, did not influence the percentage of
endorsed positive and negative traits. Older adults had thus a
less differentiated processing of the traits across the various
experimental conditions. Note however, that consistent with a
good self-esteem (Orth et al., 2018), and a general high level
of optimism (Borges & Dutton, 1976) or a “positivity effect”
in ageing (Tomaszczyk & Fernandes, 2012, 2013), the ratio of
“yes” responses for positive traits was high across categories
in older adults (close to 70%) and similar to the highest ratio of
“yes” responses observed for young adults in the future con-
dition. Conversely, older adults were significantly less likely
to endorse negative traits across all memory types compared
with young adults. Also compatible with this positivity effect
in ageing, in the recognition task, older adults had a higher hit
rate for positive than negative traits, and their hit rate for
positive traits (83%) was similar to the average hit rate ob-
served in young adults (84%; for whom the valence effect in
recognition performance was weaker).
For young adults, ERP analyses revealed that, at posterior
parietal sites where it is typically measured (Rugg & Curran,
2007; Wilding & Ranganath, 2012), the amplitude of the LPC
was maximal for the episodic condition, intermediate for the
self-knowledge conditions and minimal for the general se-
mantic condition (see also Tanguay et al., 2018, 2020). Over
right hemisphere sites, future self-knowledge also produced
larger LPC amplitudes than present self-knowledge, consis-
tent with the idea that time perspective modulates how self-
knowledge is accessed in young adults, and that thinking
about future traits may have involved increased episodic pro-
cessing (Tanguay et al., 2018; Tanguay et al., 2020). None of
these differences were significant in the older adults. Thus,
consistent with our hypotheses, there was no difference across
memory types, and temporal orientation did not modulate the
mean LPC amplitudes in older adults. The averaged difference
in LPC amplitude between the temporally distant (i.e., past
and future) and present self-knowledge conditions were relat-
ed with episodic memory function in older adults. Those older
adults with better episodic memory function had larger LPC
amplitude differences between the temporally distant and
present self-knowledge conditions. The neural correlates of
these memory types might be more differentiated in these
older adults, and they might better be able to recruit episodic
processes when thinking about distant selves. Additionally, at
posterior parietal sites, the old-new effect (difference between
hits and correct rejections) was only significant in young
Fig. 11 Scatter plot of the correlation between the memory composite
score (based on logical memory and Rey–Osterrieth complex figure de-
layed recall performance) and the LPC time difference (mean of future
minus present and past minus present) in older adults, including the trend
line (solid black line)
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adults. We would expect similar findings if we replaced the
lab-based episodic memory task with an autobiographical ep-
isodic memory task (see, for example, Johnson et al., 2011;
Renoult et al., 2016), but this should be tested. Even though
the small effect size (ηp
2 = .03) for the mean LPC amplitude
over the posterior ROI signifies that finding such an effect of
Memory in older adults would be challenging, if possible at
all, the results of our study should be replicated because of the
novelty and exploratory nature of some analyses. More gen-
erally, the idea of a recruitment of episodic processes for se-
mantic forms of memory in ageing and in conditions with
severe decline in episodic memory is little studied (but see
Duff et al., 2019; Grilli & Verfaellie, 2016). The factors
influencing the engagement of episodic processes (e.g., spa-
tiotemporal context) and their role should be further
examined.
As different scalp distributions are sometimes observed in
older adults, as compared with young adults (e.g., Ford &
Kensinger, 2019; Horne et al., 2020; Newsome et al., 2012),
we also tested whether older adults may have similar effects as
young adults in the LPC time window at other scalp sites
(frontal, sagittal, para-sagittal). At frontal sites, there were
some significant modulation of voltage amplitudes in the
LPC time window by memory type (episodic memory differ-
ing from all other memory types, and future self-knowledge
from present and past self-knowledge) but again only in
young adults. At sagittal sites, voltage amplitudes in the
LPC time window were more positive for episodic memory
than for present self-knowledge in older adults. In young
adults, additional differences between memory types were ob-
served, such as differentiation between episodic memory and
general semantics, as well as present and future self-knowl-
edge. In contrast, at left para-sagittal sites, some differences
between memory types, albeit more limited than at posterior
parietal sites, were found in both age groups. At these elec-
trode sites, voltage amplitudes in the LPC time window were
more positive for the episodic condition than for all other
conditions.
The fact that a reduced differentiation of memory types was
observed at sagittal and left para-sagittal sites in both age
groups (essentially differences in LPC amplitudes between
episodic memory and all other conditions) argue against the
idea that these effects would be a form of compensation in
older adults (Cabeza et al., 2018). Compensation by selection
or reorganization occurs when older adults recruit processes or
brain regions that young adults do not (Cabeza et al., 2018).
Similarly, some limited N400 differences between memory
types were also observed in both age groups . This is consis-
tent with a general preservation of semantic memory in ageing
and with relatively similar N400 effects (the difference be-
tween two experimental conditions) in young and older adults
(Wlotko et al., 2010). However, even if N400 effects are sig-
nificant in older adults (and thus conditions are significantly
differentiated), the magnitude of the difference between con-
ditions is sometimes reduced (Federmeier & Kutas, 2005;
Federmeier et al., 2003; Ford et al., 1996). Here, for both
young and older adults, N400 amplitudes were maximal for
general semantics and self-knowledge and clearly smaller for
episodic memory. At certain electrode sites (sagittal and right
para-sagittal), future self-knowledge also produced less nega-
tive amplitudes than general semantics. Even though the mag-
nitude of the N400 difference between memory types ap-
peared slightly reduced in older as compared with young
adults (see scalp maps of Fig. 7), there were no significant
interaction between memory types and age. Taken together,
these results are thus consistent with the hypothesis that a
dedifferentiation of subtypes of declarative memory with age
is more apparent for the LPC than for the N400. It is possible
that in the present task the N400 findings reflect “mainte-
nance” (Nyberg et al., 2012) of semantic processes in older
adults that are sufficient to perform the task. More generally,
our findings are consistent with a semanticization of declara-
tivememory in older adults (Levine et al., 2002; Renoult et al.,
2020; St Jacques & Levine, 2007) and a decline of episodic
memory function in ageing (Alghamdi & Rugg, 2020;
Cansino, 2009; Tromp et al., 2015). Hence, self-knowledge,
like events, might be represented in more generic terms and
might be more abstracted from contexts in ageing. Trait
knowledge may be slower to update and may become inaccu-
rate (as research on patients with episodic memory deficits
suggests; reviewed in Strikwerda-Brown et al., 2019).
Interestingly, there were no significant difference in N400
amplitude between general semantics and past or present self-
knowledge in the present study (present self-knowledge argu-
ably constitutes the most straightforward comparison to gen-
eral knowledge, as the general semantics condition did not
include any mention of time), similar to previous findings by
Tanguay et al. (2020). Similarly, in a study by Coronel and
Federmeier (2016), N400 amplitudes were found to be very
similar for self-knowledge and general knowledge, even if
there was a statistical trend for personal knowledge to produce
smaller amplitudes. In the study of Tanguay et al. (2018),
general semantics produced larger N400 amplitudes than all
self-knowledge conditions over sagittal sites, but not over
para-sagittal electrode sites (and no effect over sagittal sites
in Tanguay et al., 2020). Future studies are thus required to
clarify how N400 may differentiate personal and general
knowledge and whether the small differences that have been
reported in some previous studies are due to imperfect
matching between conditions or to some genuine differences
in how personal and general knowledge is processed. This
latter possibility would be consistent with the finding that
other types of personal semantics, like knowledge of autobio-
graphical facts and memories of repeated events, were report-
ed to differ in N400 amplitude from knowledge of general
facts (Renoult et al., 2016).
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One potential limitation of the present experimental design
is that we did not have enough trials per condition to differ-
entiate ERP effects according to response and emotional va-
lence. However, as reported in our previous study, the effect
of temporal orientation on LPC amplitude did not depend on
the valence of the traits (Tanguay et al., 2020). Another po-
tential limitation of the present design, and of studies using
similar paradigms, is that the effects of time perspective may
not be perfectly equivalent in young and older adults, as older
adults typically perceive that their traits change less through
time and traits indeed becomemore stable with ageing (Rutt &
Lockenhoff, 2016). Further, older adults may have experi-
enced and foresee experiencing fewer major life events than
young adults with a 5-year period; these turning points may
particularly be important to inform knowledge about a distant
self. A possible alternative, at least for the past condition, may
be to ask participants of each age group to think about a spe-
cific age (e.g., 15) or a certain life transition. However, using
such experimental designs, the remoteness of the time period
would no longer be matched across age groups, and remote-
ness is known to affect LPC effects (Roberts et al., 2013;
Tsivilis et al., 2015). Moreover, it is important to note that
even though a different processing of temporal perspective
in ageing could have affected corresponding LPC effects, it
would not have applied to the LPC old-new effect, which was
also reduced in older adults. Crucially, even though, a clear
differentiation of memory types was only observed in young
adults at posterior parietal sites, older adults participants with
higher composite episodic memory scores had a greater LPC
effect of time perspective. Taken together, these findings are
consistent with the fact that age-related neural dedifferentia-
tion may be material and region specific (Koen et al., 2020;
Koen & Rugg, 2019), and suggest that declarative memory
subtypes are less distinct in ageing, but that that the amount of
differentiation varies with episodic memory functions.
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